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THERE IS NOTHING PRAGMATIC ABOUT 
ORIGINALISM 
David S. Law* & David McGowan** 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport propose that originalist consti-
tutional adjudication produces better consequences than competing ap-
proaches.  They say they have “sketch[ed] the main elements of a pragmatic 
defense of originalism.”1  We disagree.  Pragmatism is about how well 
things work in practice, not how they should work in theory.2  McGinnis 
and Rappaport’s argument turns pragmatism on its head: it rests not on any 
evidence of originalism’s actual superiority to other approaches, but rather 
on theoretical claims about the supermajoritarian character of originalism 
and the merits of supermajoritarian policymaking. 
 
Part I of this essay explains why originalist judging does not honor the 
results of what McGinnis and Rappaport would consider “appropriate” su-
permajoritarian decisionmaking.  Part II demonstrates that supermajority 
rules do not necessarily lead to the adoption of beneficial policies.  We 
show that the actual effect of such rules depends upon a host of additional 
factors that cannot be analyzed in the abstract.  In Part III, we review the 
ways in which McGinnis and Rappaport understate or ignore the costs of 
originalism, relative to those of other approaches.  Finally, in Part IV, we 
present evidence that non-originalist judicial decisionmaking has, in fact, 
done a good job of enhancing social welfare, as measured by popular ap-
proval of the Court’s decisions.  
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Assistant Adjunct Professor of Political Sci-
ence, University of California, San Diego.   
**  Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  We are grateful to Dan Farber, Susan Franck, Ethan 
Leib, Robert Post, Mike Ramsey, Larry Solum, and David Zaring for their extremely valuable comments 
and suggestions.  
1  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 68, 69 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/1/ (link). 
2  See, e.g., Charles Saunders Peirce, How To Make Our Ideas Clear, in 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: 
SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 124, 132 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) (advo-
cating an epistemological approach focused upon “effects, which might conceivably have practical bear-
ings”). 
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I. THE CONSTITUTION WAS NOT ADOPTED BYA SUPERMAJORITY 
McGinnis and Rappaport claim that “appropriate” supermajority rules 
tend to result in the entrenchment of welfare-enhancing policies.3  They 
also claim that the Constitution and its amendments have been passed (for 
the most part) under such rules.4  It follows, they argue, that courts will 
maximize social welfare by applying only the original, supermajority-
approved understanding of constitutional provisions.5  The Constitution was 
never approved by a supermajority, however, and therefore does not satisfy 
the basic condition of their argument for originalism.  
A. Only White Males Ratified the Constitution 
With admirable candor, McGinnis and Rappaport concede that a “glar-
ing defect” in the procedures used to adopt the Constitution was “their ex-
clusion of African-Americans and women from the franchise.”6  They 
concede, too, that the ratification of the Constitution by nothing more than a 
white male plurality goes to “the theoretical heart of the supermajoritarian 
argument.”7  
To salvage their argument, McGinnis and Rappaport must explain how 
a supermajority at time t2 could confer its imprimatur upon a constitution 
adopted earlier at time t1.  They do not.  They simply observe that the Civil 
War amendments gave blacks the right to vote, and that women obtained 
the right to vote in 1920.  But that would solve the problem only if blacks 
and women had been asked to ratify the Constitution retroactively.8  They 
were not.  
What McGinnis and Rappaport do say, instead, is that they see no 
“strong case that the Constitution would have been systematically different 
had these excluded groups been included.”9  Absent “strong evidence” that 
such systematic differences would have existed, they argue, originalism is 
still welfare-enhancing because the provisions of the original Constitution 
“offer the best evidence of what good entrenchments would have resem-
bled” under appropriate supermajority rules.10   
There are several problems with this line of argument.  First, McGinnis 
and Rappaport offer no support, either empirical or theoretical, for their 
 
3  Id. at 70. 
4  See id. at 70, 73. 
5  Id. at 69–70. 
6  Id. at 73 n.22. 
7  Id. at 79.  
8  Professor Leib makes the same point in his own response to McGinnis and Rappaport.  See Ethan 
J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists 
and Non-Originalists, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 113, 117 n.19 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/7/ (link). 
9  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 81 n.55. 
10  Id. 
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conclusion that political participation by blacks and women would have 
neither defeated the Constitution nor changed it in any meaningful way.  
They offer only assertion, backed by an insistence that anyone wishing to 
prove them wrong must satisfy a heavy burden of proof.  
Second, it is questionable whether a supermajority of the entire adult 
population would in fact have ratified the original Constitution.  It seems 
doubtful, for example, that blacks would have endorsed the fugitive slave 
clause of Article IV,11 much less the enshrinement of the slave trade found 
in Article I, Section 9.12  To many people in 1787, however, a constitution 
without protections for the slave trade would no doubt have been “system-
atically different,” and in a highly unattractive way:  the inclusion of such 
provisions may well have been the price that had to be paid to secure the 
support of white southerners in pivotal slave states.13  The Constitution was 
a political agreement, and a political agreement is by definition a bundle of 
compromises.  No one can say what kind of constitution would have been 
ratified in 1787—or, indeed, if a constitution would have been ratified at 
all—had the deal begun to unravel.14 
Third, the argument is self-defeating.  If McGinnis and Rappaport are 
right that the will of a supermajority can be correctly divined by thought 
experiment, then the actual use of supermajoritarian procedures becomes 
unnecessary.  All constitutional decisionmaking and, indeed, all lawmaking 
could, in that case, be done faster and cheaper by thought experiment, while 
 
11  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (link) (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis-
charged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.”).  
12  Id. art. I, § 9 (“The Migration and Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for 
each Person.”).  Perhaps such provisions are what McGinnis and Rappaport have in mind when they say 
that the Constitution would not have been “systematically different” had blacks and women voted:  ex-
cise a few offending provisions, they might argue, and the essential elements of the Constitution (what-
ever those might be) would still have passed by a supermajority. 
13  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA:  THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 137–52 (1986) (discussing how the issue of slavery was “en-
meshed with a host of other problems” and “ran into everything,” and noting the awareness of northern-
ers that “the Convention could not interfere with slavery very much, if at all, if they hoped to keep the 
Deep South states in the union”). 
14  There is also a deeper conceptual reason why it makes no sense to say that blacks and women 
would have voted to ratify the Constitution in 1787.  A world in which blacks and women could vote on 
such matters would have been a very different place.  The rules that denied the franchise to blacks and 
women did not exist in isolation.  They both reflected and perpetuated an entire system of social, politi-
cal, and economic inequality.  An eighteenth-century America in which blacks and women could vote 
on a proposed constitution would necessarily have been a radically different and more egalitarian place 
in other ways as well.  This different, and better, version of America would presumably have experi-
enced different needs and expressed different aspirations.  These are the kinds of profound differences 
that can influence the substance of a nation’s constitution. 
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reaching the same result that actual supermajority voting would have pro-
duced.  There would be no need to incur the time and expense of the consti-
tutional amendment process; nor would there be any need for judges to 
adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution.  Instead, judges could 
adopt up-to-date, welfare-enhancing policies in any given situation simply 
by asking themselves what a hypothetical supermajority would choose. 
What McGinnis and Rappaport are defending on pragmatic grounds is not 
originalism, but rather counterfactual speculation about the behavior of a 
supermajority that never existed as a historical matter. 
B. A Supermajority of States Is Not a Supermajority of Voters15 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue in favor of supermajority action by 
voters and legislators.16  Yet the Constitution was not ratified by a superma-
jority of either group of people.  It was ratified, instead, by a supermajority 
of states.  
A supermajority of states is a far cry from a supermajority of actual 
people for several reasons.  First, only a simple majority of state delegates 
or representatives was needed to commit a state in favor of ratification.17  
The delegates from Massachusetts, for example, ratified the Constitution by 
a vote of only 187 to 168,18 while those from New York did so by an 
equally unimpressive margin of 30 to 27.19  Second, only a simple majority 
of voters was required to elect those state delegates.  
To see just how far a supermajority of states can diverge from a su-
permajority of actual people, imagine that the Constitution were to be sub-
mitted to the states for ratification today under the same formula employed 
by the Framers.  Under Article VII, nine out of thirteen states were required 
to ratify the Constitution.20  Today, that nine-thirteenths formula would re-
quire ratification by thirty-five out of fifty states (rounding up to the nearest 
whole number of states).  The population of the United States is approxi-
mately three hundred million people,21 but the fifteen most populous states 
are home to over two-thirds of that total.22  This means that, under the Arti-
 
15  We are indebted to Dan Farber for prompting us to address this point. 
16  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 70–73. 
17  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:  Constitutional Amendment Outside Article 
V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 487 n.112 (1994); Leib, supra note 8, at 120. 
18  See Michael Allen Gillespie, Massachusetts:  Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION 138, 158 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). 
19  See Cecil L. Eubanks, New York:  Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, in RATIFYING 
THE CONSTITUTION, 300, 328 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). 
20  U.S. CONST. art. VII; see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 73. 
21  U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Data Sets, http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2007) (link). 
22  In descending order of population, those states are California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, North Carolina, New Jersey, Virginia, Massachusetts, Wash-
ington, and Indiana.  See id. 
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cle VII formula used by the Framers, the Constitution could be ratified by a 
70% supermajority of states containing less than one-third of the nation’s 
voters.23  Moreover, because only a bare majority of state voters is needed 
for any given state to ratify, the nationwide proportion of voters whose sup-
port would be needed to ratify the Constitution under the Framers’ formula 
must be further reduced by nearly half, to less than 17% of the electorate.   
As a historical matter, it is more than a mere mathematical possibility 
that the supermajority of ratifying states represented less than a supermajor-
ity of voters.  John Marshall himself observed that “it is scarcely to be 
doubted that, in some of the adopting states, a majority of the people were 
in opposition.  In all of them, the numerous amendments that were pro-
posed, demonstrate the reluctance with which the new government was ac-
cepted.”24  New York exemplifies this reluctance.  According to Hamilton, 
two-thirds of its ratifying convention and four-sevenths of its populace were 
opposed in principle to the new Constitution, but the convention neverthe-
less voted to ratify out of a widespread fear that failure to do so might lead 
to geographic partition of the state.25  It is thus highly questionable whether 
the Constitution was favored by a supermajority of the white male minority 
that was eligible to vote, much less by a supermajority of the entire adult 
population.  
We are not the first to make the point that a supermajority of states is 
not truly a supermajority.  Ethan Leib makes a similar point in his own 
criticisms of McGinnis and Rappaport’s thesis.26  In reply, McGinnis and 
Rappaport argue that “the inclusion of a majority component” within a su-
permajority voting system does not transform the entire system into one of 
simple majority rule.27  If a rule requiring ratification by nine of thirteen 
 
23  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the proportion of people in each state who can vote is 
the same. 
24  II JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 127 (1834). 
25  See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (June 8, 1788), in 5 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 2, 3 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962) (reporting the fear among 
New Yorkers that “separation of the Southern district from the other part of the state . . . would become 
the object of the Fœderalists and of the two neighbouring states”); see also MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 
28 n.1 (observing that New York was “apparently dragged into [ratification] by a repugnance to being 
excluded from the confederacy”).  Forrest McDonald put the vote for electors to the New York conven-
tion at about 16,000 to 7,000 against ratification, producing a convention of 46 opponents to ratification 
and 19 advocates.  FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 114 (1979).  Scholars have con-
cluded—perhaps on the basis of Hamilton’s letter—that New York ratified because Virginia’s ratifica-
tion a month earlier made it inevitable that the Constitution would be adopted, and because Jay and 
Hamilton threatened to take New York City out of the state and into the Union if the convention voted 
against the Constitution.  See id. at 115; Eubanks, supra note 19, at 325–30.   
26  See Leib, supra note 8, at 120. 
27  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Supermajoritarianism:  Defending 
the Nexus, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 18, 24 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/18/ (link). 
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states is only a majority rule, they ask, what would a rule requiring seven 
out of thirteen states be?28   
This response betrays too great a fascination with the formal charac-
terization of voting rules, and too little concern for what pragmatists are 
supposed to care about—namely, the welfare of actual people.  People, not 
states, bear costs and reap benefits.  The number of states required for rati-
fication is therefore a red herring, as is the rhetorical question of how a 
seven-state requirement would differ from a nine-state requirement.  The 
first concern for any pragmatist ought to be the extent to which actual peo-
ple, not geographically defined political units, were for or against the Con-
stitution.  
II. SUPERMAJORITARIAN LAWMAKING DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
ENHANCE WELFARE 
The basis of McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument is their claim that 
supermajority rules entrench desirable policies.29  Neither logic nor experi-
ence supports this claim very well.  
First, there is no logical basis to conclude that supermajority rules en-
trench good policies, for a very simple reason:  preferences vary in inten-
sity.  Even if the beneficiaries of a policy outnumber the losers, the losers 
may suffer to a much greater extent than the beneficiaries gain.  The sheer 
proportion of people who approve of a policy tells us how widely the costs 
and benefits of the policy are dispersed, but it does not show that the policy 
increases net social welfare.  Nothing prevents a supermajority from adopt-
ing policies that reduce net welfare as long as the costs of such policies are 
sufficiently concentrated.  Slavery provides an obvious example:  a society 
in which three-quarters of the citizenry are free and one-quarter are slaves 
can muster supermajority support for slavery, simply because the benefits 
of slavery are widely dispersed, while the costs are narrowly concentrated.  
Yet it would be wrong to conclude on this basis that the gains to the slave-
holders exceed the losses to the slaves. 
 
28  See id.  The gist of McGinnis and Rappaport’s position seems to be that more is better:  the 
greater the consensus of any kind needed to adopt a policy, the better the resulting policy.  For example, 
the requirement of a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress is, in their view, a desirable supermajor-
ity rule because it “requires a greater consensus than a mere majority, even though a mere majority of 
the people in each district can put those legislators in office.”  Id. at 24.  By the same logic, a rule requir-
ing a supermajority of states rather than people would still be a welfare-enhancing supermajority rule 
simply because it requires more consensus than a rule requiring a majority of states.  
“More is better” is an appealing slogan, but one that ultimately leads to ruinous results.  If McGinnis 
and Rappaport truly mean to argue that greater consensus is always better than lesser consensus, then 
logic dictates that they should favor total consensus in the form of unanimity requirements, which would 
of course lead to complete gridlock.  They do not go that far; neither, however, do they qualify their 
“more is better” view or recognize the existence of a potentially thorny tradeoff between degree of con-
sensus and gridlock. 
29  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 70. 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/27/ 91 
102:86  (2007) There Is Nothing Pragmatic About Originalism 
Second, bargaining may produce supermajority support for pernicious 
measures.  In lawmaking, there is always more than one issue on the 
agenda, and some people inevitably care more about some issues than about 
others.  The result will be bargaining between those who favor a certain pol-
icy on issue A and those who favor a certain policy on issue B.  Such bar-
gaining lies at the very heart of politics, and it frequently results in the 
adoption of widely opposed policies (such as the everyday pork-barrel 
spending bills that supermajority rules do nothing to prevent). 
Our slavery example illustrates both points.  Imagine a nation consist-
ing of three equally populous regions:  Oldland, Newland, and Southland.  
All residents of Oldland oppose slavery but favor tariffs.  All residents of 
Southland wish to maintain slavery but oppose protectionism.  All residents 
of Newland oppose both slavery and protectionism.  Thus, a two-thirds ma-
jority opposes both slavery and protectionism.  Nevertheless, a single stat-
ute (or constitution) that entrenches both slavery and tariffs could muster a 
two-thirds majority, as long as Oldland is prepared to accept slavery in ex-
change for tariffs and Southland is prepared to do the opposite.  
Our point is not that supermajorities invariably adopt bad policies.  Our 
point, rather, is that there is no theoretical basis for arguing—as McGinnis 
and Rappaport do—that supermajority rules tend to result in the adoption of 
better policies.  That claim can only be made on the basis of additional fac-
tual evidence, which they do not offer. 
 
III. TIPPING THE SCALES:  THE RELATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
ORIGINALISM AND PRAGMATISM 
In this Part, we identify four flaws in McGinnis and Rappaport’s cost-
benefit analysis, all of which serve to disguise the actual costs of original-
ism and to inflate its benefits relative to other approaches.  First, superma-
jority approval of amendments is very costly, to the point that beneficial 
amendments may never be adopted.  Second, originalism is subject to sig-
nificant error costs.  Third, a court may pick better policies than a superma-
jority.  Fourth, the costs of originalism accumulate during the inevitable 
delay that attends our supermajoritarian process of constitutional amend-
ment.  
A. The High Cost of Supermajority Action 
McGinnis and Rappaport are dismissive of both the costs entailed by 
flaws in the original Constitution, and the costs involved in any effort to 
correct them via formal amendment.30  In their reply to Professor Leib, for 
example, they assert that any defects in the original Constitution “are not 
 
30  It may be more accurate to say that they are inconsistent.  At one point they say “entrenched 
norms cannot be easily eliminated.”  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 71. 
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likely to be all that costly—or else they would be eliminated.”31  That asser-
tion is neither responsive nor correct.  First, small costs are still costs, 
which any pragmatist or utilitarian would avoid if possible.  Second, even 
the costliest of defects can endure indefinitely if the costs of correcting the 
defect are sufficiently high.  
Securing the nationwide supermajoritarian action needed to adopt a 
constitutional amendment is notoriously difficult and costly.  Attention 
must be drawn to the topic, people must be educated, and collective action 
problems must be overcome.32  Even for seemingly uncontroversial issues, 
these can be formidable tasks, as the history of the most recent amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution aptly illustrates.  It is difficult to find anyone who 
objects to the idea that members of Congress should have to wait an elec-
tion cycle before reaping the benefit of a pay raise that they have awarded 
themselves.33  Yet it took over two hundred years to ratify this simple rule 
in the form of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.34   
Other welfare-enhancing, supermajority-favored constitutional changes 
are likely to prove even more difficult to enact via the amendment process.  
Many of the silliest restrictions on personal freedom, such as prohibitions 
on contraception, criminal laws against sodomy, or even bans on interracial 
marriage, may exist in only a few states.  Citizens in other states might un-
derstand that such laws are harmful, yet also rationally question why they 
should spend their scarce time and energy voting on constitutional amend-
ments to permit conduct that their states do not ban in the first place.  That 
 
31  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 27, at 24. 
32  See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 1–65 (rev. ed. 1971) (explaining the inherent difficulties of collective action); JACK 
L. WALKER, MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA:  PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 41–55 (1991) (discussing the role of institutions and policy entrepreneurs in overcoming 
collective action problems and mobilizing large groups of people on questions of policy).  
33  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.”). 
34  See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes:  The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498 (1992).  Nor is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment the only 
example of how difficult it can be to secure constitutional change that enjoys supermajority support.  
Consider also Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal:  in the 1936 election, Roosevelt won over 60% of the 
vote, carried every state except Maine and Vermont, and secured a whopping three-quarters Democratic 
majority in Congress.  See David E. Kyvig, The Road Not Taken:  FDR, the Supreme Court, and Consti-
tutional Amendment, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 463, 465 (1989).  Yet even Roosevelt, a master politician with a 
massive electoral and legislative majority at his disposal, despaired at the difficulty of having to secure a 
constitutional amendment in order to overcome the Court’s resistance to the New Deal—so much so that 
he chose instead to embark upon his now-infamous campaign to pack the Court.  See id. at 464–68 (not-
ing FDR’s perception of the constitutional amendment process as “impossibly difficult,” notwithstand-
ing his firsthand experience with earlier, successful amendment efforts).  The eventual and effective 
remedy for constitutional doctrine that had fallen badly out of sync with pressing needs and circum-
stances was a change of course on the part of the Court itself—the so-called “switch in time that saved 
nine.”  See, e.g., Michael Comiskey, Can A President Pack—or Draft—the Supreme Court?  FDR and 
the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1046–47 (1994). 
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such restrictions exist in relative isolation implies that they inflict costs on 
relatively few people and thus might never attract sufficiently widespread 
action to bring about a constitutional amendment to overturn them.   
B. The Error Costs of Originalism 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that judges cannot be trusted to engage 
in pragmatism because “the judges’ own preferences would substantially in-
terfere with the accuracy of their perceptions of social change.”35  Yet the 
argument cuts both ways.  “The judges’ own preferences” can also “inter-
fere with the accuracy of their perceptions” of original meaning.36 
Nor is bias the only obstacle to originalism done right.  As historians 
have often complained, there is nothing inherently reliable about “law of-
fice history” performed by judges (or, more accurately, their law clerks) in 
the shadow of a particular case.37  Meanwhile, ever-increasing scholarly 
disagreement over what “originalism” is, and how it ought to be done, 
raises the question whether it is even possible to identify the costs and bene-
fits of the approach.38   
Originalist-minded judges will make mistakes about history.  And 
when they do, the supposed pragmatic benefits of originalism are lost, on 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s own account.  Indeed, if the error rate is high 
enough—and much commentary by historians suggests it is very high—
there would be no pragmatic reason at all to choose originalism.  How often 
the Court will actually get it wrong, we cannot say.  But neither can 
McGinnis and Rappaport, who do not even acknowledge the problem. 
C. The Opportunity Costs of Originalism 
McGinnis and Rappaport assert that supermajoritarian measures have 
distinctive beneficial properties such as helping people transcend ethnicity 
 
35  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 27, at 23. 
36  Id.; see, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 299–300 
(1988) (deeming it a “notorious fact” that the Justices have routinely “abus[ed] historical evidence in a 
way that reflects adversely on their intellectual rectitude as well as on their historical competence”); Al-
fred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:  An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 155 (surveying the 
Court’s long tradition of twisting history to its own purposes, and assessing the results as “very poor in-
deed,” from a “professional point of view”). 
37  E.g., LEVY, supra note 36, at 299–300, 313–21, 388–89 (bemoaning the quality of “law office 
history,” and observing that “examples of the historical illiteracy of the Supreme Court can be multiplied 
ad nauseum”); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (remarking upon the poor quality of “law office history”); Kelly, supra note 
36, at 132 (same).  
38  To pick one exchange involving McGinnis and Rappaport, see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and 
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappa-
port, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 
2007); and Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
(forthcoming 2007). 
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and geography.39  The logic behind this assertion is not clear, but their 
premise appears to be that, in order to obtain supermajority assent, a meas-
ure must be acceptable to enough people that it embodies a truly national 
norm that is not very divisive.40  They argue that non-originalist judicial de-
cisions lack these salutary qualities both because judges might settle on 
some norm other than the one that a supermajority would endorse, and be-
cause judicial intervention preempts the operation of the amendment proc-
ess.41 
It is true that judges may fail to adopt a more welfare-enhancing norm 
that would otherwise have been embodied in a constitutional amendment.  
The reverse, however, is also true:  pragmatic judges may adopt a more 
welfare-enhancing norm than the amendment process would select.  Sup-
pose the norm “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” is bet-
ter than “separate facilities can be equal if we just try harder.”  Does anyone 
seriously think that a national supermajority in 1954 would have chosen the 
better of the two norms?  Supermajorities and judges may choose differ-
ently, but McGinnis and Rappaport offer little reason to think that superma-
jorities will choose better than judges.42  
In fact, there may be little or no room for supermajorities to choose 
better rules.  What, exactly, were the alternatives to the rules adopted in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,43 Eisenstadt v. Baird,44 Loving v. Virginia,45 or 
Lawrence v. Texas?46  Such cases pose essentially binary policy choices.  
Married and single couples either may or may not use contraceptives; peo-
ple of different races either may or may not marry; people of the same gen-
der either may or may not have consensual sex.  If there is only one choice 
that improves on the status quo, and judges are routinely in a position to 
make that choice more quickly and cheaply than the amendment process, 
what sort of pragmatism refuses to let them make that choice? 
 
39  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 71–72. We find this assertion surprisingly ahistorical.  
For one thing, it begs the question of when, exactly, America has ever transcended its ethnic or geo-
graphic differences, with or without the help of supermajority rules.  For another, history demonstrates 
that supermajority requirements can easily perpetuate ethnic and geographic divisions.  To take one ex-
ample, the Senate’s supermajoritarian filibuster rules thwarted welfare-enhancing measures such as anti-
lynching laws and thereby helped prolong Southern apartheid for decades.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, 
MASTER OF THE SENATE:  THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 93, 218 (2002).  
40  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 71–72. 
41  See id. at 78. 
42  What little reason they do give is discussed below in Part IV.  
43  381 U.S. 479 (1965) (link) (holding that a state law prohibiting the dispensing of contraceptives 
to married people violated a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy”). 
44  405 U.S. 438 (1972) (link) (extending the rule of Griswold v. Connecticut to unmarried couples 
on equal protection grounds). 
45  388 U.S. 1 (1967) (link) (striking down a state law against interracial marriage on equal protec-
tion grounds). 
46  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (link) (invalidating a state law against same-sex sodomy on substantive due 
process grounds). 
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D. The Cumulative Costs of Originalism 
McGinnis and Rappaport take the position that judges should refuse to 
alleviate suffering that they could alleviate.  Only if judges do so, they ar-
gue, will society take notice of that suffering and choose whether to end it 
via the amendment process. 
In the meantime, however, the costs of a bad rule will continue to ac-
cumulate over time.  Where a rule generates costs that can be ameliorated or 
avoided, it is ordinarily better to fix the rule sooner rather than later, for the 
same basic reason that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow:  
happiness deferred is happiness lost in the interim. 
It is nevertheless worth the wait for an amendment, argue McGinnis 
and Rappaport, because the eventual benefits of supermajority decision-
making will exceed the immediate payoff of judicial problem-solving.  But 
there is not much reason to think that our patience and endurance will be 
rewarded in the end.  It is uncertain that an ameliorating amendment will 
ever be adopted, thanks in part to the high cost of supermajority action.47  It 
is even less certain that such an amendment would adopt a better policy 
than a pragmatic court would have chosen.  In fact, as we have seen, there is 
plenty of reason to expect the opposite.48  Still less certain is the adoption of 
a rule so much better that it compensates for all the suffering we have en-
dured in the meantime. 
At most, their reasoning suggests that, in some cases, it might be util-
ity-maximizing for judges to ignore evidence, to refrain from utility analy-
sis, and to follow a blanket rule of originalism.  In other words, they have 
argued for a form of rule utilitarianism, even if they do not call it that.  But 
in what cases, and using what rule? Even if it is a good idea for judges to 
obey blanket rules of constitutional adjudication, there are alternatives to 
originalism that might perform better—say, a rule of obedience to public 
opinion polls that reveal a supermajority preference, or of conformity to a 
supermajority view among courts worldwide.49   
Alternatively, it might be best to ditch rules altogether and opt for act 
utilitarianism, which in this context we might call case utilitarianism, or 
simply judicial pragmatism—namely, the case-by-case maximization of 
utility by judges on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.  After all, cost-benefit 
analysis makes sense in a lot of situations, including judicial decisionmak-
 
47  See supra Part III.A. 
48  See supra Parts II & III.C. 
49  Other possibilities include rules that do not displace, but instead reduce the burden of, full-blown 
judicial cost-benefit analysis.  For example:  only issue decisions you expect to be enforced; never order 
taxes raised; keep your hands off foreign relations.  The choice is not between originalism and impossi-
ble calculation.  The choice is between originalism and pragmatic analysis informed by a long institu-
tional history and, typically, the experience evinced by the record of a concrete case.  It might indeed be 
hard to specify, for example, the utility-maximizing rule of sexual behavior in general, but it is not 
nearly as hard to decide the much narrower question whether a ban on prosecution of consensual same-
sex acts increases net social welfare. 
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ing.50  From a pragmatic perspective, it is not clear why constitutional cases 
should be any different.  
IV. A PRAGMATIC DEFENSE OF PRAGMATISM 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument about the relative superiority of 
originalism boils down to their assertion that the Supreme Court is bad at 
deciding constitutional cases in a pragmatic, utility-maximizing way.51  The 
basis for their claim that the Court is bad at pragmatic utility-maximization 
is that (1) there are not many justices—far fewer than the nose-count 
needed for a constitutional amendment; (2) the Court decides things by ma-
jority vote, not supermajority vote; and (3) the justices are “elite lawyers” 
who “work in Washington.”52 
It is hard to see what these observations prove about the Court’s apti-
tude for pragmatism.  There are thousands of elite lawyers who work in 
Washington and make countless policy decisions.  They do so, moreover, in 
small groups, or even individually, on a far-from-supermajoritarian basis.  
Some are agency officials and legislative aides; others are members of 
Congress and Cabinet secretaries.  Very few wear black robes.  Do 
McGinnis and Rappaport mean to suggest that they are all bad at policy-
making?  
Whether the Court is bad at maximizing utility on a case-by-case ba-
sis—and whether it would do a better job by sticking with originalism—
depends instead upon a number of empirical questions that McGinnis and 
Rappaport do not even acknowledge.  They never refer, for example, to the 
actual costs and benefits of pragmatic judicial decisions, or even to some 
proxy for those costs and benefits, such as public reaction.  They never stop 
to ask whether judges are sophisticated or naive policymakers, or whether 
the judges’ preferences actually lead them to make bad decisions.  In fact, 
they offer no account of how non-originalist justices decide cases.  Are the 
justices indifferent to costs and benefits?  Are they better or worse than a 
popular supermajority at ascertaining the consequences of their actions?  Do 
their preferences coincide with those of the median voter?53  If not, do they 
attempt to keep the median voter happy anyway?  
 
50  Suppose, for example, that an originalist cannot decide on the historical record whether the First 
Amendment condemns prosecutions for seditious libel.  Presumably McGinnis and Rappaport would 
want a judge to do his best to work through the consequences of a decision allowing or forbidding such 
prosecutions.  Judges do not magically lose this ability when the historical record is clearer.  
51  See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 27, at 23 (arguing that the judiciary is unlikely to 
“capture true social change” because “the judges’ own preferences would substantially interfere with the 
accuracy of their perceptions of social change”). 
52  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 75. 
53  See, e.g., Neal Devins, The D’Oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1347–
50 (2007) (link) (arguing that the appointments and confirmation process has produced “a Court whose 
preferences generally track the median voter”); infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text (arguing that, 
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Admittedly, there is no way to perform an actual head-to-head utility 
comparison of originalism and non-originalism.  It is impossible to hook up 
the American population to utility-meters and measure the difference in 
overall utility between a hypothetical world in which the Court adjusts con-
stitutional doctrine continuously as it deems best, and a hypothetical world 
in which the Court adheres to originalism.   
Judged against what we do know, however, McGinnis and Rappaport’s 
wholesale indictment of judicial policymaking is wholly unwarranted.  We 
know something about how actual non-originalist decisions have been re-
ceived in the real world, and this information is obviously relevant to any 
choice between originalism and non-originalism on pragmatic grounds.  If 
non-originalism tends to produce outcomes that people like, that fact alone 
is good reason to choose non-originalism on pragmatic grounds, and we 
should choose originalism only if it would yield even better outcomes that 
people would like even more.   
Let us consider, therefore, how people actually feel about non-
originalism.  We can safely say, for starters, that the general public does not 
fetishize originalism for its own sake.  Quite frankly, the general public 
would probably be hard-pressed to distinguish originalism from a hole in 
the ground.  This is the same general public, after all, that thinks Clarence 
Thomas is the most liberal member of the Court.54  To be sure, members of 
the public can be highly attentive to the Court’s work when their immediate 
interests are directly at stake55:  it should come as no surprise, for example, 
that Orthodox Jews in the New York area were aware of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kiryas Joel.56  To the extent that people know enough 
about a Supreme Court decision to be unhappy about it, however, it is safe 
to assume that their objection will be to the substantive policy result, not to 
the Court’s choice of a non-originalist approach per se. 
We also know that many of the Court’s most obviously creative deci-
sions have been warmly embraced over time, to the point that they are now 
considered beyond question.  The doctrines announced in Brown v. Board 
of Education,57 Griswold v. Connecticut,58 Eisenstadt v. Baird,59 and Loving 
                                                                                                                           
contrary to the premises of most contemporary constitutional theory, the Court is largely a majoritarian 
institution). 
54  When asked to name the most liberal member of the Court, respondents in a 2006 survey picked 
Justice Thomas twice as often as Justice Stevens and three times as often as Justice Breyer.  See Kevin 
T. McGuire, The Judicial Branch:  Judging America’s Judges, in A REPUBLIC DIVIDED 194, 198 fig.1 
(Annenberg Democracy Project ed., 2007); see also, e.g., Devins, supra note 53, at 1340–41 (mustering 
a spate of statistics to illustrate that Americans know “[n]ext-to-nothing” about the Constitution). 
55  See Gregory A. Caldeira & Kevin T. McGuire, What Americans Know About the Courts and Why 
It Matters, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 262, 266 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005). 
56  Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see Valerie J. Hoekstra, 
The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 91–93 (2000) (discussing 
awareness of the case within New York’s Hasidic Jewish community). 
57  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  We are of course aware of originalist efforts to bring Brown into the fold.  
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Segregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952–
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v. Virginia60 are as much a part of the American ethos as the document in 
which they cannot be found.61  The Constitution that forbids racial apartheid 
in public schools and protects the right of unmarried couples to use contra-
ception is the Constitution that Americans know and love, regardless of 
what anyone may have written or intended in 1789 or even 1868.   
In fact, if public opinion is any indication of whether the Court is 
reaching desirable outcomes, there is much reason to think that a non-
originalist Court gets things right—more so, indeed, than our elected offi-
cials do.  We know that the public is generally satisfied with the Court’s 
performance, non-originalist warts and all.  Study after study has found that 
the American people have greater, and more consistent, faith in the Court 
than in other institutions of government.62  Not even Roe v. Wade63 appears 
to have disturbed the public’s overall approval of the Court.  In fact, Roe 
marked the middle of a period of sharply increasing public confidence in 
the Court.64   
Finally, we know that the Court’s decisions are, whether by coinci-
dence or design, remarkably consistent with public opinion.65  Empirical 
                                                                                                                           
53 (1995).  Nevertheless, the view of Brown as contrary to nineteenth-century understanding is the stan-
dard, and best-supported, originalist view.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based 
Social Movements On Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 
(2002) (“Virtually no one has been persuaded by McConnell’s learned account.”).  It was, in any event, 
the view held by the justices who decided Brown that they were departing from the original understand-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 302–
08 (2004). 
58  381 U.S. 479 (1965)  (holding that a state law prohibiting the dispensing of contraceptives to 
married people violated a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy”). 
59  405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the rule of Griswold v. Connecticut to unmarried couples on 
equal protection grounds). 
60  388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a state law against interracial marriage on equal protection 
grounds). 
61  The fact that “the Constitution” transcends the words set to paper centuries ago has long been 
evident to acute observers and has only grown more obvious over time.  See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, 
The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 passim (1934) (distinguishing “the Document” 
from “the Constitution”). 
62  See, e.g., Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 55, at 264 (“[O]ver and over again, polls show that 
Americans have more confidence in the Court than either the president or the Congress.”); McGuire, 
supra note 54, at 206 (reporting the results of a 2006 Gallup poll revealing public esteem for the Court 
to be “at its highest level in several years, well above that of the Congress and the president”); Jeffery J. 
Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. 
POL. 1114, 1116 (1997) (observing that “aggregate support for the Supreme Court consistently exceeds 
levels for Congress and the executive branch”). 
63  410 U.S. 113 (1973) (link). 
64  See Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword:  Dynamics of Public Confidence in 
the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1213 & fig.1 (1986). 
65  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606 
(2003) (“[T]he wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of the time judicial decisions fall within 
the range of acceptability that one might expect of the agents of popular government.”); id. at 2607 
(“[I]n the main the results of Supreme Court decisionmaking comport with the preferences of a majority 
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studies have found repeatedly that the Court’s constitutional decisions have 
been largely in sync with public opinion.66  Indeed, it appears that the 
Court’s actions are more often in sync with the general public than those of 
the elected branches.67 The constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren and 
Burger Courts—surely a low point for originalism—was no exception to 
this general trend.68   
If public satisfaction with the Court is any measure of whether the 
Court is any good at making constitutional law in a pragmatic, non-
originalist, welfare-enhancing way, the answer seems fairly clear:  yes, it is.  
McGinnis and Rappaport might demur that people could be even better off 
if the Court stopped trying to anticipate their wishes and instead let them 
work up the energy to pursue the amendment route.  This is true.  One can-
                                                                                                                           
or at least a strong plurality, something that many political scientists now take as a given.”); Jeffrey J. 
Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. 
POLITICS 1114, 1120 (1997); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Coun-
termajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 87, 91–95 (1996) (reporting a significant correlation between public opinion and the outcome 
of Supreme Court decisionmaking, subject to a five-year lag); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, 
Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspec-
tive, 58 J. POL. 169, 186–96 (1996) (finding a significant correlation between public opinion and the vot-
ing behavior of approximately half of all justices over the preceding forty years). 
66  See, e.g., Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion, Representation, and the Modern Supreme Court, 
16 AM. POL. Q. 296, 297–98 (1988) (same); Thomas R. Marshall & Joseph Ignagni, Supreme Court and 
Public Support for Rights Claims, 78 JUDICATURE 146, 148–49 (1994) (reporting that the Court is much 
more likely to rule in favor of constitutional claims that enjoy public support, than constitutional claims 
that do not); Alan D. Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980–1993, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 6, 
12–13 & 13 tbl.1 (1998) (reporting that overall federal policy is consistent with majority preference only 
about 55% of the time); Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous 
Branch, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 123, 140 (Ken-
neth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005) (observing that “the Court’s decisions match majority 
opinion more often than not and about as often as the other branches”). 
67  Compare THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 78–81 (1989) (re-
porting that the Court’s decisions on constitutional issues are in sync with public opinion approximately 
60% of the time) with Alan D. Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980–1993, 62 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 6, 12–13 & 13 tbl.1 (1998) (reporting that overall federal policy is consistent with majority prefer-
ence only about 55% of the time). 
68  See Marshall & Ignagni, supra note 66, at 148–49 (finding that, from 1953 through 1992—a pe-
riod that spans the entirety of both the Warren and Burger Courts—the Court ruled in favor of civil 
rights claims 73% of the time when supported by public opinion, but only 40% of the time when not 
supported by public opinion). 
To be sure, the public does not endorse everything that the Court does.  There is significant evi-
dence, for example, that invalidation of federal statutes erodes public support for the Court, at least in 
the short term.  See Caldeira, supra note 64, at 1219 tbl.1, 1222–23.  Yet this finding does not imply that 
the Court would make people happier by adhering to originalism:  as it has repeatedly demonstrated, the 
Court is perfectly capable of striking down federal statutes in the name of originalism.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (link) (striking down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act on 
the grounds that it exceeds an originalist understanding of Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (link) (striking down the federal Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 for similar reasons). 
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not disprove a proposition about the path not taken. Our response is simple:  
yes, people might be better off under originalism.  But the evidence sug-
gests this is doubtful, because judicial pragmatism is hard to beat.  The 
pragmatic thing to do, it turns out, is to stick with pragmatism. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport are brilliant and thoughtful schol-
ars.  It is to their credit that they have even attempted the task of reconciling 
originalism and pragmatism, which have long been mortal enemies.  They 
have tackled a difficult—we suspect impossible—challenge with creativity 
and originality.  Even in the world of constitutional theory, however, specu-
lation can only go so far. 
There is nothing pragmatic about either originalism or their defense of 
it.  Pragmatism is about paying attention to consequences, which in turn 
demands observation and measurement.  Yet observation and measurement 
are precisely the things that McGinnis and Rappaport want our judges to 
avoid, and which, tellingly, they themselves avoid when it comes to how 
our judges have actually performed.  When it comes to pragmatism, theory 
and conjecture are no substitute for empiricism.  
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